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Abstract
The objective of this thesis is to find out how dominant firms in a liberalised electricity
market will react when they face an increase in the level of costs due to emissions trading,
and how this will affect the price of electricity. The Nordic electricity market is chosen as the
setting in which to examine the question, since recent studies on the subject suggest that
interaction between electricity markets and emissions trading is very much dependent on
conditions specific to each market area. There is reason to believe that imperfect
competition prevails in the Nordic market, thus the issue is approached through the theory
of oligopolistic competition. The generation capacity available at the market, marginal cost
of electricity production and seasonal levels of demand form the data based on which the
dominant firms are modelled using the Cournot model of competition. The calculations are
made for two levels of demand, high and low, and with several values of demand elasticity.
The producers are first modelled under no carbon costs and then by adding the cost of
carbon dioxide at 20€/t to those technologies subject to carbon regulation. In all cases the
situation under perfect competition is determined as a comparison point for the results of
the Cournot game. The results imply that the potential for market power does exist on the
Nordic market, but the possibility for exercising market power depends on the demand
level. In season of high demand the dominant firms may raise the price significantly above
competitive levels, and the situation is aggravated when the cost of carbon dioixide is
accounted for. Under low demand leves there is no difference between perfect and
imperfect competition. The results are highly dependent on the price elasticity of demand.
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Tiivistelmä
Tutkielman tavoite on selvittää, kuinka määräävässä markkina-asemassa olevat yritykset
reagoivat päästökaupasta aiheutuvaan kustannusten nousuun, ja kuinka tämä vaikuttaa
sähkön hintaan vapailla sähkömarkkinoilla. Kysymyksen tarkastelu rajataan
Pohjoismaiseen sähkömarkkina-alueeseen, sillä viimeaikainen tutkimus aiheesta osoittaa,
että jokaista markkina-aluetta on tarkasteltava erikseen sille tyypillisten olosuhteiden
valossa. On perusteltua olettaa, että Pohjoismaisilla sähkömarkkinoilla vallitsee
epätäydellinen kilpailu, joten aihetta lähestytään oligopolistisen kilpailun teorian kautta.
Markkinoilla oleva kapasiteetti, sähköntuotannon rajakustannukset sekä kysynnän taso eri
vuodenaikoina muodostavat aineiston, jonka pohjalta yritysten toiminta mallinnetaan
Cournot-kilpailuun perustuen. Tulokset lasketaan kahdelle eri kysynnän tasolle ja useille eri
kysynnän hintajoustoille ensin ilman hiilidioksidin kustannuksia ja tämän jälkeen lisäten
kustannuksiin päästökaupasta aiheutuva kulu olettaen, että päästöoikeuden hinta on 20€/t.
Jokaista tapausta varten määritetään myös kilpailullisen markkinan tasapaino
vertailukohteeksi. Tulosten mukaan mahdollisuus markkinavoiman hyödyntämiseen on
olemassa, mutta tämä riippuu kysynnän tasosta. Korkean kysynnän vallitessa tuottajat
onnistuvat nostamaan hinnan huomattavasti kilpailullisen tason yläpuolelle, ja
päästökaupan huomioiminen kasvattaa erotusta entisestään. Matalan kysynnän kausina
eroa täydellisen kilpailun ja oligopolin välisissä hinnoissa ei ole. Tulokset ovat erittäin
herkkiä valitulle kysynnän hintajoustolle.
Avainsanat
Sähkömarkkinat, päästökauppa, epätäydellinen kilpailu, Cournot
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51. Introduction
It can without doubt be stated that climate change is one of the major issues of the
new millennium. The possible threats induced by increasing average global
temperatures have caused governments to react, resulting in the formation of a
new branch to environmental and energy policy, namely, climate policy. An
important step along the way was the United Nations Framework Convention on
Climate Change (UNFCCC), an international environmental agreement that came
into force 1994. The UNFCCC is perhaps most famous for the Kyoto Protocol, an
extension to the Convention adopted in 1997. This protocol places a legal
obligation on the signatories to reduce their emissions of greenhouse gases as an
average over the first commitment period 2008-2012. EU has agreed to reduce its
emissions during this period by 8 % from 1990 levels. This common target is
divided among 15 Member States under a burden sharing agreement. To help
reach its goal with least cost to society, the EU has chosen to make use of
emissions trading within the Union’s boundaries.
The idea of emissions trading as a cost effective way of reducing emissions of
pollutants dates back to the 1960s. It was presented by Dales (1968), and formal
proof of equilibrium was provided a few years later by Montgomery (1972). The first
sophisticated emissions trading scheme implemented was the United States’ Acid
Rain Programme, which aimed at reducing emissions of nitrous oxides (NOX) and
sulphur dioxide (SO2). The programme has been a success; emission targets were
reached sooner than expected and with less costs than predicted (Ellerman et al.,
2003).
The EU emissions trading scheme (EU ETS) began operation in 2005. The rules
for the scheme are laid out in the emissions trading Directive 2003/87/EC, which
came into force in October 2003. The Directive groups the following industries
under a cap-and-trade trading system: energy, metal, mineral, and pulp and paper.
According to the Directive, these sectors must cover their yearly emissions of CO2
6with a corresponding amount of allowances, of which one allowance equals one
tonne of carbon dioxide equivalent. From their issuance to the surrender date the
allowances are transferable, and each transaction will be recorded in the national
registries. The initial allocation of allowances is set out in the national allocation
plans, in which each Member State declares the total amount of allowances to be
allocated for each period and how this will be divided among the participating
installations. According to the Directive, at least 95 % of allowances shall be
allocated free of charge for the period 2005-2007, and 90 % for the Kyoto period
2008-2012. (2003/87/EC.)
The biggest sector covered by the EU ETS is the energy sector with approximately
60 % of all participating installations (CITL 4.6.2006). The energy sector differs
from the others in that the markets are not global due to the non-storability and
transfer losses related to energy. Indeed, during times of congested transmission
lines, electricity markets may be very local. Also, the emissions from energy
production depend on the mix of generation technologies, which vary from country
to country and provide differing possibilities for reducing emissions.
These facts have raised the question of how emissions trading will interact with the
electricity markets. In most EU-151 countries the electricity market is liberalised;
price formation is no longer controlled by an authority. Electricity intensive
industries now fear rising productions costs, as electricity producers are assumed
to pass on the additional cost of carbon to consumer prices.
The effect of emissions trading on the price of electricity is in principle rather
simple. The introduction of emissions trading increases the cost of those
production technologies that rely on carbon-based fuels. This affects the merit
order; the ranking of producers by rising marginal production cost. A new merit
1 EU-15: Austria, Belgium, Denmark, Finland, France, Germany, Greece, Ireland, Italy,
Luxembourg, Netherlands, Portugal, Spain, Sweden, UK.
7order implies that the marginal, price setting technologies will change. It is
therefore evident that there will be an impact on electricity prices.
In practice, there are many factors affecting price formation and thus the passing
on of additional costs. One of these is the structure of the market. In case of
imperfect competition in the commodity market, price setting is no longer solely
determined by demand and supply conditions as in perfect competition. In addition,
it is also affected by the strategic choices of the firms. Predicting the price
increases resulting from an increase in production costs becomes more
complicated, since firms no longer simply align their actions with marginal cost but
rather make decisions based on the expected reactions of demand and
competitors.
The prominent role of the electricity industry in the ETS also raises the issue of
possible market power in the allowance market. The biggest companies are
allocated large amounts of allowances (EUAs), and this could give them a
dominating market position. Using markets of tradable emission rights as a
strategic instrument has been studied by for example Hahn (1984) and Misiolek
and Elder (1989). Considering the use of market power in both the commodity and
allowance market further complicates estimating the impacts of emissions trading
on prices.
Since the adoption of the EU Directive on emissions trading, a number of studies
have emerged concerning the interaction of electricity markets and the EU ETS.
Some are country specific, such as Kara et al. (2006) concerning Finland, Linares
et al. (2006) concerning Spain and IPA (2005) concerning the UK. Other studies,
for example Sijm et al. (2005), Ilex (2004), and ECON (2004), cover a larger
market area. Of these, Sijm et al. also model the effects under imperfect electricity
markets. In general, the studies suggest that a comprehensive answer to the
question cannot be given. For example demand patterns, the technology mix and
8the structure of the electricity market influence the passing on of additional costs
from carbon. These are conditions which are specific for each market area.
The question of imperfect market structure in deregulated electricity markets has
been studied widely since the liberalisation of markets began some 20 years ago.
This stems from the fact that many markets had big regulated producers before
market restructuring, and privatisation brought forth the question of possible
monopoly or oligopoly structure in the new market. Most often the studies have
been based on traditional Cournot analysis or on supply function competition,
which aims to describe more accurately the bidding behaviour of producers in
electricity markets functioning as auctions. Two much cited papers are those of
Borenstein and Bushnell (1999), who use a Cournot model to study the California
electricity exchange and von der Fehr and Harbord (1993), who develop a simple
supply function approach to the UK electricity market. Ocaña and Romero (1998)
and García-Díaz and Marín (2003) have later used similar approaches to model
the Spanish electricity market.
The interaction between the EU ETS and the electricity market is the motivation for
this study. A specific market area, namely, the Nordic electricity market, has been
chosen as the setting in which to examine the impact of emissions trading on
electricity prices. The Nordic market has previously been studied in NENA (2004),
and also some of the aforementioned papers on the EU ETS and electricity
markets encompass the Nordic market area. However, these reports suffer from
lack of data, since studies conducted before 2005 must rely on predictions of
allowance prices. As was perceived, the allowance price was much higher than
was expected and also its volatility made predicting the future price developments
a difficult task. Also, the possibility of imperfect market structure has not been
taken into account in detail in the previous studies.
The common market of Denmark, Finland, Norway and Sweden is considered to
be one of the best functioning liberalised electricity markets. The amount of
9electricity traded in the spot market has grown steadily from 96,9 terawatt hours
(TWh) in 2000 to 176 TWh in 2005 (Nord Pool, visited 21.6.2006), while total
electricity generation was 395 TWh in 2005 (Nordel 2005). The spot price is
considered transparent and reliable, and it is used as the reference price for
bilateral contracts. However, the Nordic market is becoming increasingly
concentrated, which raises issues of market power. For example Amundsen and
Bergman (2002) and Nilsson (2005) have shown that there is a risk of imperfect
competition due to mergers and cross-ownership between the major power
companies. Therefore, market structure must be addressed when studying the
Nordic electricity market. On the other hand, the question of market power in the
allowance market is not relevant since the Nordic companies are not big enough to
give raise to this concern.
In this setting it is interesting to explore how the Nordic market will react to the
changes brought on by emissions trading. The objective of this thesis is to find out
how dominant firms in a liberalised electricity market will react when they face an
increase in the level of costs due to emissions trading, and what will be the
resulting impact on the price of electricity. This interaction will be studied under
Cournot competition. The model used by Borenstein and Bushnell (1999) will be
applied to the Nordic power market to model the behaviour of power producers
under emissions trading. The producers will first be modelled under no carbon
costs and then by adding the cost of CO2 to those technologies subject to carbon
regulation. The results can then be compared to give indications of how power
prices in Nord Pool will be influenced under the EU ETS.
This paper is structured as follows: to give a base for the study, the following
section will present the functioning of the liberalised electricity market with specific
attention given to the market environment and the organisation of the market in the
Nordic countries. Section 3 presents the theoretical setting for analysing price
impacts; the mechanisms of how market power and emissions trading affect price
10
formation will be presented. Section 4 describes the analysis of the market and the
results from the Cournot model, and section 5 concludes.
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2. The Liberalised Electricity Market
This chapter explains who takes part in the different actions related to trading
electricity and introduces the different ways of organising a liberalised electricity
market. Special attention needs to be given to the characteristics of electricity since
they have implications on the design of the market. After this introduction to
electricity markets, the Nordic market will be described in more detail. When
considering the effects of tradable emission permits for CO2, the technology mix
must be studied in order to know how vulnerable the sector is to additional costs
related to carbon regulation.
2.1 Market Actors in Electricity Markets
Deregulated electricity markets consist of regulated and competitive components
which must function together to ensure cost efficient and reliable production and
supply of electricity. The electricity market may be separated into five different
parts: generation, transmission, supply, distribution and end use. Supply in this
context means the retail sales of electricity to final users whereas generation is the
actual production of electricity from energy sources such as coal, gas, biomass or
hydro reservoirs. The structure of the new market is illustrated in figure 1.
12
Figure 1. The structure of the deregulated electricity market.
Generation and Retail
Generators own capacity which they use to produce electricity. This product is then
sold on the market to retailers who will further sell it to satisfy final demand.
Electricity may be sold through bilateral contracts or on the wholesale market.
Distribution of the product is done via the high voltage transmission grid and the
low voltage distribution grid.
In practice generating companies may also be retailers and the role they choose to
take will depend on the market price. In addition, some generators may have the
responsibility of maintaining local distribution networks, in which case this part of
their actions is regulated and must be separate from generation and supply.
Transmission and Distribution
Transmission means moving electricity from one place to another in the high
voltage grid. Transmission lines cover relevant areas within national boundaries,
and they may also extend to neighbouring countries, allowing for international trade
GENERATION
TRANSMISSION
DISTRIBUTION
END USE
RETAIL
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of electricity. The owner of the grid is responsible for maintaining the transmission
lines and building new ones.
There are many complexities related to the functioning of the transmission grid.
Building new lines is costly, and investors may find that they cannot gain sufficient
return on their investment. The operation of the grid needs constant balancing of
power that is injected and taken from the grid in order to maintain appropriate
voltage and frequency and avoid damaging the lines. This and other services,
called ancillary services, need to be provided in order to ensure proper functioning
of the grid and security of electricity supply. These services are public goods since
they benefit all market participants, and therefore they need to be regulated.
Transmission lines may also be considered a public good because they reduce
market power by increasing competition between generators. To ensure proper
functioning of the market, secure supply and non-discriminatory access to the grid,
transmission must remain regulated. (IEA 1999, 13-14; Stoft 2002, 18,26.)
The party providing the ancillary services is called the system operator. An
independent system operator (ISO) is a non-profit monopoly entity. The monopoly
may also be a for-profit entity, in which case it will need to be extensively
regulated. (Stoft 2002, 21.) The system operator may also be called a transmission
system operator (TSO) which means the non-profit organisation is also responsible
for the transmission grid.
Distribution is the transmission of electricity in the low-voltage distribution network
which extends all the way to final residential end-users. Like transmission,
distribution must also be regulated due to the technical nature of the distribution
network. Distribution is provided by regional power companies, which may also
function as generators or retailers in the competitive market for power. Distribution
activities such as charging transmission fees must be separated from commercial
activity and third party access must be guaranteed. Transmission and distribution
are monitored by an authority.
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System Operator Services
Ancillary services can be listed in several ways depending on what basis they are
grouped. Here they are grouped under six headings following Stoft (2002). Voltage
and frequency stability, transmission security and black-start capability are services
related to the security and proper technical functioning of the network. Frequency
and transmission security are controlled by adjusting real-time supply and demand,
and the market-based way to do this is to use the real-time market which will be
described later on. Voltage is usually controlled by substations and transformers,
but it can also be maintained by injecting so-called reactive power into the grid.
The TSO regulates the supply of reactive power to make sure the right amount is
supplied at a reasonable price. Black-start capability refers to generators who can
start up without electricity from the grid in case a large area of the connection has
been shut down. This service must be provided by the system operator which can
for example purchase it from adequate generators. (Stoft 2002, 232-242.)
Economic dispatch and trade enforcement are directly related to the functioning of
the wholesale electricity market. Economic dispatch simply means that production
takes place in the cheapest possible way. This requires that the correct generators
start up, which is called the unit commitment problem. Also, the producing
generators must be used for the correct amount of time. Dispatch being economic
in real time is the only thing that matters. However, starting up is slow and
expensive, and therefore the day-ahead market for electricity must give correct
signals for generation in real time. Trade enforcement needs to be provided since
electricity cannot be tracked. Someone must meter the amount of power
generators inject into the grid and suppliers withdraw to be able to know whether
commitments are met. The traders in the markets would not have incentives to
report their actions honestly, so the task is assigned to the system operator who is
independent from both parties. (Stoft 2002, 232-242.)
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2.2 Characteristics of Electricity
Electricity is unlike most goods traded on the market. It has features which make it
different and impose requirements on the organisation of the market for electricity.
Also the production of electricity has certain qualities which intervene in the
formation of a competitive price. The production issues combined with the features
of electricity complicate the process of determining price in a deregulated market.
Product qualities
The International Energy Agency lists three qualities which apply to electricity and
distinguish it from other products (IEA 1999, 11):
1. Electricity demand fluctuates
2. Electricity is not storable
3. The cost of consumption exceeding supply (brownouts or blackouts) is
significant.
Fluctuating demand is caused by daily and seasonal variations in consumption.
Obviously, more electricity is needed during the daytime when most electricity
consuming appliances are used. Also, demand is greater during the weekdays
than on weekends. Seasonal variation is due to weather conditions. These
fluctuations in demand reflect on the price of electricity, which moves in a similar
pattern with consumed amounts with the price being higher during the daytime and
in seasons of increased demand.
The non-storability of electricity means that supply must always equal
consumption; it is impossible to buy electricity in advance and save it for later use.
This means that generation and demand must constantly be balanced, an
important task which is handled by the system operator. Non-storability also affects
16
prices, since they cannot be smoothed by buying cheap electricity and using it
when prices go up.
Should there be a disturbance in the balance between consumption and supply,
especially one where supply cannot satisfy consumption, the result would be that
some consumers would need to be cut off from the distribution of electricity. The
consequences of course depend on the magnitude and location of the cut-off, but
the potential costs arising from a blackout in a city or an industrial production area
are significant enough to make this a risk not worth taking. Also in this case, it is
usually the system operator which is responsible for acquiring reserves which may
be activated in case of disturbances in generation.
Fluctuating demand, a non-storable product and the constraint of production
equalling consumption impose a requirement on the amount of capacity: “capacity
must equal or exceed load (consumption) at all times” (IEA 1999, 11, parentheses
added). This means that there will always be generating units which are not used
most of the time but must exist for there to be sufficient generating capacity when
extreme demand peaks occur.
Demand-side Flaws
In addition to electricity having special characteristics which influence the design of
markets, there are also demand-side aspects which must be taken into account.
Stoft (2002, 15) recognises two flaws on the demand side, which have an impact
on buying and selling electricity:
1. Lack of metering and real-time billing
2. Lack of real-time control of power flow to specific customers.
Most customers do not know the amount they consume per day, or the actual price
of that amount. This results in demand which is rather inelastic. Especially this
17
concerns smaller consumers who may be billed a few times a year at a price fixed
for long periods of time. Demand not responding to price accentuates the problem
of peak load: peak load electricity is expensive, and should this price be reflected
in consumer prices, there would be an incentive to reduce demand at these times.
Currently, however, customers do not know when they are contributing to peak
demand, nor that this is more expensive.
The second flaw results from the fact that once electricity is injected into the grid it
will flow according to the law of physics and it is impossible to determine who has
produced the power being taken from the grid at a certain location. This “prevents
physical enforcement of bilateral contracts and results in the system operator being
the default supplier in real time” (Stoft 2002, 15). Contracts can be and are made
for a generator to produce a certain amount for a buyer, but in the end the buyer
will receive electricity that is a mix of all generation and also, it is possible to take
more from the grid than has been settled for. This implies that there must be a
reliable method for monitoring produced and consumed amounts and settling the
contracts based on actual metered data.
Production Issues and Price Formation
In the case of no market power, price is equal to the aggregate marginal cost of
producers and it is determined at the intersection of the supply and demand
curves. At this price total surplus is maximised and no-one can gain from changing
their behaviour. The market clears since supply equals demand.
In electricity markets this price cannot always be obtained, even though the market
is competitive. Generators have costs such as start-up costs and no-load costs
(the cost of running a generator without producing), which result in a non-convex
cost function. In these cases, setting price equal to marginal cost might not be
sufficient to induce generation. Also, there may be no price at which supply equals
demand. Despite this, a competitive market for electricity that functions as an
18
auction may find a price that results in demand and generation that come very
close to clearing the market. An equilibrium price exists although it might not clear
the market completely. The existence of a definite set of rules for determining the
acceptance and settling of bids guarantees that that the auction will have at least
one Nash equilibrium in which no-one can be better off by altering their behaviour.
(Stoft 2002, 245-246.)
Another issue related to electricity production is the fact that some producers can
only produce at full output once they are started. Also, some cannot operate below
a minimum level, after which they can adjust their output. This means that
sometimes in real time if only a small increase in generation is needed to satisfy
demand, a whole block of generation may need to be started if this is the cheapest
capacity available. Consequently, some generation needs to be backed down for
the demand-supply balance to be maintained. In this case marginal cost should be
defined as the cost of the (cheaper) generation which was backed down since this
is the capacity which would be used to supply the next increment in load. Setting
the price in this case is a problem solved differently depending on the market form.
In any case, a situation can be found in which prices lead to correct signals. (Stoft
2002, 275-276.)
2.3 Competitive Market Designs
In the market for electricity, an important feature is that transmission and
distribution, which are essential parts of the sector, remain regulated. Transmission
is a monopoly and in order for competition in generation and retail to be possible,
non-discriminatory access to the grid must be provided. This is a key issue to be
taken into account when considering what kind of institutional setting to adopt for
the competitive market. The options can be divided into two categories; a market
based on grid access and a market based on a competitive pool. Several variations
of these are possible under both. (IEA 1999, 46.)
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The following will first briefly present the functioning of a market based on grid
access, and then consider in more detail the setting of a competitive pool, since
this is the market design applied in Nord Pool.
The Grid Access Design
A market based on grid access assumes there is an owner of the transmission grid
who may be vertically integrated, that is, also responsible for generation. It is the
owner of the grid who must provide access to the grid for all parties. There may be
several ways for determining the terms and conditions for access to the grid; they
may be negotiated with market actors or they may be regulated by an independent
regulator. (IEA 1999, 46.) In this type of market, trading is based on bilateral
contracts and there may also be a financial market for trading derivatives.
Under regulated grid access, it is possible to make sure that all competitors, mainly
in generation, have the possibility to enter the market. It can be ensured that the
grid owner will not discriminate in favour of himself. Also, regulated access will
likely produce lower total transaction costs compared to a negotiated market
design. However, the possibility remains that the vertically integrated utility will try
to play against the rules and prevent competitors from using the grid. Also,
inefficiencies may rise due to the fact that bilateral contracts may not follow the
most efficient dispatch order, price information is not transparent and total costs
may not be reflected in prices because of the small amount of transactions in a grid
access model. (IEA 1999, 50.)
The Competitive Pool Design
A competitive pool refers to a spot market for wholesale electricity which is
combined with rules for grid access. The pool design requires vertical separation of
transmission and generation, and the manager of the pool must be separate from
transmission and distribution. In the spot market generators and suppliers will
20
place bids and this will determine the merit order, thus solving the unit commitment
problem, and also set the system price for electricity. This price may be highly
volatile, and therefore financial markets will be necessary to allow hedging for risk.
(IEA 1999, 47-48.)
A pool has some features which make it likely to be more efficient than a grid
access market, at least in the short run. A competitive spot market is more efficient
than bilateral contracts because the system price determined daily in the pool will
determine the cost-minimising merit order, which ensures that demand is met with
the least cost production. There are many transactions in a competitive pool and
this leads to costs being better reflected in prices. Also, price information is
transparent and available to all. This facilitates decisions for entry and investment.
(IEA 1999, 50-51.)
The competitive pool design combined with bilateral trades is the most commonly
used market setup. A competitive pool functions as an auction, and there are
different options for organising it. An auction for electricity combines forward and
real-time markets, and it refers to centralised trading as opposed to decentralised
bilateral contracts. There is one price observed by all and trades can be made in a
short time span. This means that centralised auctions can react more quickly than
bilateral markets, which is important considering the fluctuating demand for
electricity and its non-storability. However, this does not mean bilateral trades
should not exist; they can exist alongside centralised auctions in the form of
forward markets (Stoft 2002, 206).
In fact, bilateral trades are complementary to centralised auctions. They provide
less risk than an auction with a volatile price. Trading a part of generation through
bilateral contracts reduces incertitude and leaves open the option of trading the
remaining part via the auction and possibly profiting from times of high prices. The
auction is needed to provide transparent price information and to keep overall
prices at the lowest possible level. (Perrels & Kemppi 2003, 17-18.)
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While the actual auctioning of the product takes place in a day-ahead market
conducted the day before the delivery of the product, a competitive centralised
auction consists of several markets. There is a financial market which allows
market participants to hedge against the volatility of the spot price by buying
forwards or futures. The day-ahead market determines the price and quantities for
electricity delivered the following day. The day-ahead market may also be
considered a kind of forward market, since actual consumption and the needed
production cannot be known until real time. However, the trades made in the day-
ahead market try to anticipate these levels as accurately as possible since
deviations from the contracted amounts are usually penalised. The real-time
market is conducted on the actual day of delivery and it must correct for the
possible changes from previously made contracts. This is the only market which is
a physical market and in this sense it could be considered as the spot market.
Usually the term spot market is however used to describe the day-ahead market
and the spot price refers to the price set in this auction. (Stoft, 2002; IEA, 1999.)
The Day-ahead Market
The day-ahead market may be organised in different ways. Stoft (2002, 223-224)
defines three market types; a power exchange, a transmission-rights market and a
power pool. In addition to these, a mandatory auction can be defined (Perrels &
Kemppi 2003, 14-15). All these designs are central auctions based on bids
submitted by generation and retailers representing the demand side. They
determine a price, usually called the spot price, which is used as the reference
price for derivatives and which is supposed to reflect the true costs of producing
electricity thus ensuring economic dispatch and providing correct incentives for
investing in new capacity.
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The Real-time Market
A real-time market functioning up to the last minute before delivery is needed
because demand can never be known for sure until the actual time of consumption.
It corrects the possible errors made in the day-ahead trades and settles these
financially. The real-time market is usually run by the system operator since it has
the necessary information on inputs to and withdrawals from the grid.
The real-time market must provide three of the ancillary services listed in section
2.1. These are balancing, transmission security and economic dispatch. In addition
to these, providing trade enforcement is the reason for the existence of real-time
markets. (Stoft 2002, 274.)
Trade enforcement is a matter of metering injected and withdrawn amounts of
electricity and comparing these to previously settled contracts. Deviations from
day-ahead commitments are considered as the power sold or bought in real-time
markets; day-ahead contracts will always hold and changes from these will be
settled at the real-time price. Settling can be determined by a two-settlement
system. This simply means paying (or charging) for deviations from day-ahead
contracts at the real-time price. According to this settlement, a producer who
supplies differently than contracted will be paid:
01011 )( PQQPQ -+ (2.1)
Where 1Q  and 1P  are the quantity and price determined in the day-ahead market,
and 0Q  the actual amount produced in real-time and 0P  the real-time price. (Stoft
2002, 210; 254-263.)
Balancing is done by constantly following load and generation and correcting the
amounts when they do not match. More generation may be required or some units
may need to back down if too much is produced. Correspondingly, demand could
be reduced or encouraged. This is done by setting real-time prices so that they
give the correct incentives to generation and demand. How prices are determined
23
depends on whether the real-time market functions as a pool or as an auction.
(Stoft 2002, 254-563.)
Transmission security is more complex to solve. When there are constraints in the
transmission grid, no generation can change its production without first checking
with the system operator whether the lines can take more power. This is one of the
reasons why real-time markets cannot function bilaterally. They require knowledge
on the state of the grid and it is the system operator who has this knowledge.
Therefore it is the system operator who must balance demand and generation
taking into account possible constraints in the grid. (Stoft 2002, 262-263.)
2.4 The Nordic Electricity Market
The Nordic electricity market comprises Denmark, Finland, Norway and Sweden2.
The development towards an integrated market began in 1996 when Norway and
Sweden began joint trading between their national markets for physical power
contracts. At the same time Nord Pool, the group responsible for the spot trades
was established. Finland joined the market area in 1998 and the Finnish power
exchange EL-EX began representing Nord Pool in Finland. In 2000 Denmark was
fully integrated into the market area and the Nordic market had become the first
internationally functioning electricity exchange. (Nord Pool, visited 8.11.2005.)
2.4.1 The Market Environment: Demand and Supply
The price of electricity is greatly affected by demand patterns. They determine the
marginal production technology used to satisfy demand which also sets the price at
each time according to its marginal cost of production. Demand, the technology
2 It must be noted that Norway is not an EU Member State and therefore is not obliged by the EU
ETS. Yet this does not require special attention in this study due to the dominance of hydropower in
Norwegian power production.
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mix and available capacity must be studied in order to be able to analyse potential
impacts of different factors on price.
Demand
The total consumption of electricity in the Nordic countries was 390,8 TWh in 2004
(Nordel 2004, 3). The distribution of consumption between the four countries is
illustrated in figure 2.
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Figure 2. Total consumption in 2004, GWh.
Source: Nordel 2004
There are significant differences in the level of consumption between the countries.
This is more clearly indicated by looking at the per capita consumption. The figures
are 6 574 kWh for Denmark, 16 600 kWh for Finland, 26 588 kWh for Norway and
16 252 kWh for Sweden (Nordel 2004, 18). The notable difference in these values
between Denmark and the other three countries results from the fact that, unlike
Denmark, Finland, Norway and Sweden have a significant amount of electricity
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intensive industry. Also, households commonly use electric heating in these
countries. Possible price changes due to the ETS would most likely affect these
customer groups the most. (Bergman 2002, 54-55.)
Demand in the Nordic countries fluctuates in observable patterns according to
season. Winters are cold, especially in northern parts of Finland, Sweden and
Norway, resulting in increased demand for electricity. Summers, on the other hand,
do not bring about increased demand since the temperatures are not high enough
to necessitate intensive use of air conditioning. The seasonal differences can be
observed by comparing the maximum and minimum system loads measured on
the  3rd Wednesday in January and July at 5:00-6:00 PM and 12:00-1:00 PM,
respectively.
Table 1. Maximum and minimum system load 2004.
Source: Nordel 2004
Load in MWh/h Denmark Finland Norway Sweden Total
January 2004 6 157 12 911 20 235 26 745 66 048
July 2004 4 076 8 933 10 825 13 562 37 396
A pattern is also observed in the weekly consumption of electricity. Demand on
weekdays is higher than on weekends or holidays, and there is also a variation
between day and night time uses of electricity. Figure 3 shows the consumption of
electricity in the Nordic exchange area in a week in November.
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Figure 3. The consumption of electricity in MWh/h, week 45, 2005.
Source: Nord Pool
The variation in consumption between cold and warm seasons indicates that prices
in general are higher in winter than in summer. High price spikes have been
observed on unusually cold winter days, especially if this happens in a dry year
when cheap hydro power is in low supply.
Production
Total annual production in 2004 was 379,3 TWh (Nordel 2004, 10). This comes
from different sources, which can be seen by studying the generation mix in the
four countries. Figure 4 depicts the share of different energy sources in the
production of electricity.
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Electricity generation 2004 GWh
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Figure 4. Electricity generation by source 2004, GWh.
Source: Nordel 2004
CHP 1: District heating and condensing power
CHP 2: Industry
As can be seen from above, Norway relies almost solely on hydropower; the share
of other renewable power and combined heat and power (CHP) is minimal. Finland
and Sweden have somewhat similar mixed production profiles. Sweden utilises
nuclear and hydropower to a large extent whereas Finland has a more significant
share of CHP in addition to nuclear and hydro. Out of the four countries Denmark
is the one mostly utilising fossil fuels to produce electricity; over 70 % of generation
comes from CHP. Renewable power other than hydro, that is, wind, biofuel and
waste, play a small yet noticeable role in electricity production. Denmark has the
largest share of renewable production, which is mostly due to the extensive use of
wind power in this country.
Generation technology has a significant role in the formation of the price of
electricity. As in all competitive markets, price should equal the marginal cost of
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supply. In the case of electricity, this means the marginal cost of the last unit
dispatched to meet demand. Ranking the started generators by marginal cost from
lowest to highest produces the merit order. It can also be defined as ranking the
generators by average variable cost. The merit order defines what technology will
be used to meet demand and thus it also determines the price at the intersection of
supply (the merit order) and demand. (Stoft 2002, 449.)
The technology that is last called into production is called the marginal technology.
Should this technology be subject to the ETS, its costs would increase and this
would imply an increase in electricity prices. The price determining technology
depends on the level of demand and is thus different depending on the season and
time of day. The Nordic market has a large amount of hydro and nuclear
production, which are the cheapest production technologies (see chapter 4 for
more detailed information on production costs). This means that they are used to
provide base load power, and the price determining technologies are rather the
CHP and condensing technologies.
The marginal technology and the need for fossil fuel based power are also
dependent on the water reservoirs in Norway and Sweden. In wet years supply
from hydro plants is abundant, resulting in exports from Norway and Sweden and
more base load served by this technology. This stretches the supply curve to the
right, resulting in demand and supply intersecting at a lower price. On the other
hand, if water reservoirs are low, a more expensive technology would become
marginal. (Perrels & Kemppi 2003, 22-23.)  Therefore, weather conditions, namely
rainfall and snow coverage, are important factors in determining the generation
technologies used for electricity production and thus influencing price. Figure 5
illustrates how the system price in the Nordic market area has evolved from 2002
to 2005 and the corresponding levels of water reservoirs. A notable fall in reservoir
level between 2002 and 2003 is met by a high peak in overall system price.
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Figure 5. System price and degree of reservoir fill in the Nordic market.
Source: The Swedish Energy Market 2005
2.4.2 The Nordic Power Exchange
The Nordic countries have adopted the power exchange model for the integrated
market. In a power exchange both generators and the demand side place bids
determining what quantity they are willing to supply or buy at which price for each
24 hours of the next day. The efficiency of a power exchange is based on the
assumption that generators bid their true costs as this would ensure economic
dispatch and guarantee the cheapest price for buyers. However, the issue of non-
convex costs may mean that marginal cost pricing does not cover all costs incurred
by the generator. In these cases they will bid somewhat above marginal cost. Most
of the time this problem is not relevant since scarcity rents cover costs such as
start-up costs. Scarcity rents are earned by producers when price exceeds their
marginal cost due to the fact that a higher cost generator is used. This happens
especially in peak load times when peak generators with high variable costs are
needed to satisfy demand. (Stoft 2002, 289-305.)
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The Nordic real-time market also functions as an exchange. One solution to the
real-time price determination problem is to use additional exchanges which add
flexibility (Stoft 2002, 254-563). This is exactly the method used in the Nordic real-
time market. The spot market, called Elspot, is followed by a balancing market
called Elbas.
The institutional framework for the Nordic market is provided by Nord Pool ASA.
Nord Pool ASA is a corporation owned by Statnett and Svenska Kraftnät, the
Norwegian and Swedish TSOs, and it comprises four separate companies: Nord
Pool Spot AS, Nord Pool Financial Market, Nord Pool Clearing ASA and Nord Pool
Consulting AS. (Nord Pool, visited 8.11.2005.) Nord Pool manages the spot trade
of electricity, operates a financial market and provides clearing and consulting
services. Customers include generators, retailers and traders and also some large
end-users. Trading at the power exchange is not mandatory, and bilateral trades
are made alongside spot trading. In 2003, around 31 % of total consumption was
traded at the spot market. Since the price transparency provided by the spot
market is an important service contributing to the efficient functioning of bilateral
trades, Nord Pool considers this to be a public service. Nord Pool Spot AS
operates the spot market and it is owned by the TSOs and Nord Pool, each with a
20 % share. The services provided by the financial market are commercial
activities. (Nord Pool 2003, 12; Nord Pool 2004a, 9, 29.)
Elspot
The following description of the functioning of Elspot and Elbas is based on the
report Trade at The Nordic Spot Market (Nord Pool 2004b).
Trading at Elspot concerns each hour of the following day. The process begins with
system operators informing Elspot of how much grid capacity is available for spot
market trades based on the volumes defined in bilateral contracts. At the same
time, generators and demand place their bids for the amounts they wish to buy or
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sell during the 24 hours of the following day at different price levels. The prices and
quantities in the bids are determined by the bidders; they will consider how much of
the required power is covered by bilateral contracts, and usually trade for the
remaining amount at the spot market. Usually participants will place bids for
purchasing electricity at low prices and at higher prices they choose to sell power.
Once bids have been received, Elspot places demand and supply bids in order
forming the typical upward sloping supply curve and downward sloping demand
curve. This is done separately for each hour of the following day. The intersection
of the curves determines the spot price (also called the system price) for the
specific hour. This is illustrated in figure 6.
Figure 6. The determination of system price.
Source: Adapted from Nord Pool 2004b
At this point transmission constraints are not considered. The system price is
determined as the unconstrained market price; it assumes that the whole market
area can trade any amount of electricity freely. However, bottlenecks may occur if
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flows of power between the countries exceed transmission capacity limits. If this is
detected when calculating the system price, Elspot will determine new, separate
area prices to alter the power flow between areas. This is the market based way of
dealing with congestion in the grid. The price in the area with not enough power is
increased to attract generation and to induce lower demand. Correspondingly, the
price in the area with too much power is lowered to increase demand and
discourage generation. Price adjustments are made until capacity is sufficient for
the resulting contracts. When area prices are required, they will be the basis for
financial settling of trades.
Once prices have been determined, Elspot will confirm trades, that is, it determines
who will buy and sell based on the bids and the formed prices. Elspot distributes
trade schedules to all participants and TSOs. If no complaints are filed before the
deadline, the contracts are binding. The participants will pay for purchases or will
receive payment for sales according to the relevant spot or area price. This is
called financial settlement and it is based on contracted volumes, not on metered
data.
Elbas
Elspot trades close many hours before actual delivery takes place. To give
participants a possibility to continue trading closer to delivery, Elbas has been
established. It is an aftermarket to Elspot and provides a market place for trading
up to one hour before delivery. Elbas functions in Sweden, Finland and Eastern
Denmark, the areas which rely on CHP for electricity production.
At the Elbas market, power contracts of one-hour duration are sold. The market is
opened once the Elspot market has closed and contracted amounts of power are
known. Trading takes place in the form of bids specifying a price and volume for a
specific hour. Trading for each hour contract is closed one hour before its delivery
(two hours in Denmark).
33
The Real-Time Market
The real-time markets are run by TSOs cooperating closely. Each Nordic country
has one TSO, and they are public, state owned companies, except for Finland’s
Fingrid which is jointly owned by the government (12 %), two power companies
(Fortum Power and Heat and Pohjolan Voima, each 25 %) and institutional owners
(38 %). Balancing is based on the real-time price, which is determined by bids.
When the Elspot market closes, generation and demand may submit bids to the
TSO stating a price and a volume. The bids are separated into two categories:
upward regulation or downward regulation. Upward regulation means bids for
increased generation or reduced demand. These bids state the price the
participant requires to increase generation or reduce demand and they must be
higher or equal to the Elspot price. Downward regulation bids state the price that
the participant will pay to reduce generation or increase demand and these will be
lower than or equal to the Elspot price. The TSO will rank the bids from lowest to
highest and this rank will determine who is called upon if there is an imbalance in
consumption and demand at the time of operation. (Nord Pool 2004b, 30-31.)
The upward and downward bids determine the relevant real-time price. In case
there is no congestion in transmission, a common list will be made for all countries.
The actual price is, however, not defined the same way in all areas. Norway
determines one price for each hour whereas Denmark, Finland and Sweden define
two. In all countries, when no real-time regulation is needed the price equals the
Elspot price. (Nord Pool 2004b, 30-31.)
Real-time pricing is thus determined through the balancing activities. The TSOs
collect metered data for generation and demand and use this to calculate and
charge or credit participants for imbalances. For example, if a retailer actually
withdraws less power than it has bought on the spot market, the difference will be
interpreted as a sale to the TSO and it will be credited. Correspondingly,
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withdrawing more power than contracted means buying this amount from the TSO
and the real-time price will be charged for this purchase. (Nord Pool 2004b, 32;
Nord Pool 2003, 4-5.)
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3. The Framework for Analysing Price Impacts
The following sections will provide a theoretical framework for the analysis
conducted in chapter 4. First, market power in electricity markets will be introduced
in general, focusing on the issues which distinguish the use of market power in
electricity markets from markets for conventional goods. Also, the situation in the
Nordic market will be presented in order to justify the approach adopted in this
thesis. Second, the mechanism by which carbon costs are transferred to electricity
prices will be illustrated, and the factors influencing this effect will be presented. Of
these, most attention will be given to market power. Third, the theory of the model
used in the analysis will be presented.
3.1 Market Power in Electricity Markets
Firstly, it must be noted that in electricity markets price may be above the marginal
cost of the marginal producer without this implying market power. This is due to the
aggregate supply curve being a stepwise function. Supply and demand may
intersect in the area above the marginal cost of the producing unit and below the
marginal cost of the next unit. The intersection determines the correct competitive
price, although it by definition is neither the marginal cost of the last nor the next
producer in the merit order. Figure 7 illustrates this situation. (Borenstein 2000, 51.)
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Figure 7. Price that exceeds the marginal cost of the marginal producer.
Source: Borenstein 2000, 51.
Secondly, it is also characteristic of electricity markets to be prone to very short but
high price spikes. An extreme price may occur for a few hours, reflecting the
scarcity which is present in peak demand times. The price may rise well above the
marginal cost of all generating units, and still not imply market power. This is the
reason why mark-ups are not a particularly good measure of market power in
electricity markets (Stoft 2002, 336).
Market power may be exercised by non-marginal producers. Bidding low cost units
in at a high price will cause them not to be dispatched, and this will cause a higher
price to be set by some other generator. Since all generating units will receive this
same price, a producer with many generators may find this profitable if some of its
units are called into operation. (Stoft 2002, 332-333.) The same effect can be
obtained by declaring units unavailable, due to for example maintenance or
breakdowns. This will move the aggregate supply curve to the left, causing higher
price units to be dispatched at lower levels of demand.
Also, a producer may force someone else to withhold output. This happens if a
generator bids high, knowing it will be called into generation. The generator may
P
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produce at full output and be a price taker while another unit backs down to keep
the balance between supply and demand. (Stoft 2002, 327). This is similar to the
block generation problem described in section 2.2.
As in all markets, market power is most beneficial when demand is inelastic and a
high price does not result in reduced consumption. In electricity markets demand is
rather inelastic overall, but the problem may be accentuated especially in peak
times when capacity is scarce and demand high. When demand peaks, a single
generator may have a monopoly position in relation to the residual demand if
others cannot respond to demand growth (Bergman 2002, 72).
This issue of scarcity highlights the importance of interconnector capacity in
electricity markets. More connector capacity results in more competitive markets,
as it becomes possible to import cheaper power from elsewhere. The possibility for
transmission increases the capacity available to the market and may mitigate the
problem of scarcity during peak times. It must be noted though, that very long
distances imply increasing transmission losses, which lead to an increase in the
price of imported electricity.
In electricity markets, market power can only be exercised in real time (Stoft 2002).
The price of forward contracts and bilateral contracts is fixed, and leaves no room
for market power. If a lot of power is contracted forward, this should result in
reduced benefits from market power. (Stoft 2002, 347-348). However, in matured
markets the spot price acts as a reference for forward contracts and bilateral
trading. If the spot price is on average at a high level, this will be reflected in the
price determined in forward contracts. Also, the shorter the contracts are, the more
quickly spot prices are incorporated into forward contracts, and the more incentives
there are to raise prices (Stoft 2002, 350).
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Market Power and Nord Pool
It is generally considered that market power was diluted when Denmark, Finland,
Norway and Sweden formed a common electricity market. At the time of integration
there was surplus capacity resulting from the previously regulated markets, and the
price of electricity came down as the common market began operation. (Bergman
2002, 53.) Since the beginning of the Nordic market area investment has been low
as it is now determined by market conditions. Demand has grown and it is likely
that capacity will become increasingly scarce in the future (Bergman 2002, 73).
During the winter season demand may be on a high level for several days,
especially if temperatures are very low. In such situations the areas facing high
demand will seek to import cheap power from elsewhere. This is done until all
transmission capacity is used up. As a result a regional price area will be formed,
and the market share of the local producers may be significantly increased
resulting in local market power (Bergman 2002, 58).
Another development in the Nordic market is the increased amount of mergers and
cross-ownership; developments in the ownership structure of the largest energy
companies are constantly reported in the media. For example in October 2005
Statkraft took over hydro production in Sweden and Finland and the beginning of
2006 saw Fortum buying E.ON Finland, the Finnish branch of E.ON Nordic. A
study by Amundsen and Bergman (2002) has shown that cross-ownership may
significantly increase market power. The following table illustrates the market
structure as it was at the end of 2004.
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Table 2. Market structure in Nord Pool 2004.
Source: Nordel 2004, Annual reports 2004 of companies
Generator
Production,
TWh
% of total
production
Capacity,
MW
% of
total
capacity
Vattenfall 88.4 23.3 16 878 18.5
Fortum 55.5 14.6 11 220 12.3
Statkraft 34.3 9 10 698 11.7
E.ON Nordic 33.1 8.7 7 971 8.8
Others 168 44.4 44 309 48.7
Total 379.3 100 91 076 100
Table 2 shows that both production and capacity wise, the four biggest companies
account for more than 50% of total value, with Vattenfall and Fortum generating
noticeably more than the other companies. The size of the biggest companies and
increasing electricity prices have lead to suspicion of use of market power, which is
apparent from the numerous writings on the subject in the media.
In light of these considerations, it is reasonable to assume that market power is
very likely to be present in the Nordic market, although the merging of the four
national markets did initially increase competitiveness in the electricity sector.
3.2 Emissions Trading and Electricity Price Determination
The obligation to cover emissions with a corresponding amount of allowances
places an extra cost on the obliged parties; the cost of acquiring the required
amount of permits. This is a part of the variable costs, and thus it increases the
marginal cost of producers subject to carbon regulation. In the EU ETS, allowances
are allocated for free, and if an obliged party does not exceed its allocation, it may
not need to acquire permits from the market. Nevertheless, it will incorporate the
price of the permit into its marginal cost as the grandfathered allowances represent
an opportunity cost, which, according to economic theory, is added to marginal
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cost whether allowances are actually purchased or not. (Sijm et al. 2005, 33-34;
Varian 1999, 326-327.)
Another option available to installations exceeding their allowance is to reduce
emissions. In the electricity sector this can be done by altering production
technology if available capacity allows this, or by investing in new, cleaner
technology. These actions could have an effect on the price of electricity, but they
will not be considered in this study since their impact mechanism differs from that
of additional costs.
3.2.1 The Effect of CO2 Costs on the Price of Electricity
In competitive markets price is determined at the intersection of demand and
supply, where supply is defined as the aggregate marginal cost curve of all
producers. Therefore, should this marginal cost rise by the amount of carbon costs,
this increase would be passed on to the price with the final impact depending on
the elasticity of the two curves.
In electricity markets carbon costs affect those producers whose generation
technology results in emissions of CO2. Their marginal costs will rise according to
the generated emissions, which in turn depend on the fuel used and its thermal
efficiency. Should a CO2 emitting plant be the marginal generation unit, the market
price of electricity would rise by the amount of the extra cost implied by emission
restrictions. The effect of emissions trading on the price of electricity thus depends
on the marginal generation unit and its carbon intensity. The marginal technology
may be different in peak and off-peak times, and therefore the impact on prices
varies with load conditions. (Sijm et al. 2005, 24.) The situation can be described
with a simple illustration.
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Figure 8. Change in electricity price due to carbon costs.
Source: Adapted from Sijm et al. 2005
Figure 8 presents an indicative merit order for three common generation
technologies and the inelastic demand in base and peak time. The thin line
represents the supply curve when carbon costs are incorporated into production
costs. The increase in costs is higher for coal technologies than for gas, as coal is
more carbon intensive. In this simplified setting of perfect competition, in times of
base demand coal is the marginal technology, and the increase in electricity price
is represented by ?P1. This equals the amount by which the producers’ costs have
risen due to carbon costs. In times of peak demand, gas becomes the marginal
technology, and the increase in electricity price represented by ?P2. It can be seen
that ?P2 < ?P1.
The preceding description was a simplified presentation of how the cost of CO2
affects electricity prices in theory. In practice, the relationship is more complicated.
An important factor to keep in mind is that the influence does not run only in one
direction; electricity demand also affects CO2 prices through its effects on
electricity production, and these CO2 prices then show in electricity prices (Sijm et
al. 2005, 21). Also, when estimating the impact of emissions trading on electricity
prices, it should be noted that the merit order might change due to changes in the
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cost structure of generators. Should the marginal plant change, the impact should
not be assessed only as the effect on the price resulting from the current marginal
technology. (Sijm et al. 2005, 25.)
3.2.2 Factors Influencing the Price Effect
For analysing the price effect described above, it is useful to divide this impact into
two components. Sijm et al. (2005, 33) define the pass-through rate as the
proportion of CO2 costs that the producer can transfer into market prices. This
pass-through rate consists of two parts, the add-on rate and the work-on rate. The
add-on rate is always 100 %, as the producers will pass on the whole opportunity
cost to marginal cost. The work-on rate measures how much of this added cost will
actually show in market prices. It may well be that due to market conditions the
pass-through rate is less than 100 %.
There are several reasons why the pass-through rate may be less than 100 %. It
can be affected by the allocation method, outside competition in electricity markets,
market regulation, long-term technological change, merit order changes due to
inclusion of CO2 costs, demand elasticity, and market structure. In addition, there
are several conditions that cause the actions taken in the power sector to deviate
from the optimal outcomes indicated by theory. These include: objectives other
than profit maximisation, risks, uncertainties and lack of information, and other
production constraints such as inflexible fuel markets that prevent rapid
adjustments in production in the short term. Also, volatile CO2 markets  with
frequently changing prices mean that it takes time before these costs are fully
covered by changes in electricity price. For these reasons it could be that CO2
costs are never fully passed on to power prices. (Sijm et al. 2005, 33-46.)
Of these factors, the most relevant ones to this study are merit order changes,
demand elasticity and market structure. Changes in the merit order could mean
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that the new marginal plant cannot pass on the whole opportunity cost. The
situation is best described with an illustration.
Figure 9. The level of pass-through when merit order changes.
Source: Sijm et al. 2005, 45.
In the above figure, B is the marginal technology before carbon regulation, and
price is P0. Due to regulation, the marginal cost of A rises enough for it to become
the marginal plant, and the price is now at P1, the level of A’s marginal cost. The
pass-through of costs is however less than 100 % since the change in prices, (P1 –
P0), is less than the increase in A’s cost, ?C. (Sijm et al. 2005, 33-46.)
The elasticity of demand affects final pass-through. In electricity markets demand
is considered very inelastic, which means changes in prices are mainly driven by
changes in cost structure. This would imply complete pass-through of opportunity
costs (see figure 11 below). In the long, run demand elasticity may be greater as
consumers have the possibility to adapt to higher prices by, for example, investing
in energy efficient equipment. (Sijm et al. 2005, 33-46.)
Market structure may limit the possibilities of complete cost pass-through. In
perfectly competitive markets price equals marginal cost and a shift in the supply
curve due to increased marginal costs will be passed on to the price, depending on
the elasticity of the demand curve. In the case of very inelastic demand, the
B
A
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€/MW
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situation present in the electricity market, the additional cost would be almost fully
passed on to the market price. This is illustrated in figure 10.
Figure 10. Pass-through of carbon costs in the case of perfect competition and inelastic
demand.
Source: Sijm et al. 2005, 102.
On the other hand, producers with market power do not set P=MC since they are
already setting price above the competitive level. The situation faced by a
monopolist is depicted in figure 11.
€/MW
?P
Demand
MC including CO2 cost
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Figure 11. Pass-through of carbon costs in the case of a monopoly and elastic demand.
Source: Sijm et al. 2005,102.
As can be seen in the figure, a monopolist passes on less than a competitive
producer. A monopolist sets marginal cost equal to marginal revenue, and the price
increase resulting from increased marginal cost equals ?Pm. A competitive market
would result in a price increase of ?Pc > ?Pm. This is because a monopolist takes
into account the effect its price will have on demand. Competitive firms are too
small to affect price and thus simply align their own production with marginal costs.
The case for an oligopoly is intermediate between these two extremes. Generally
speaking, it can be said that the more competitive the market is, the more of
additional costs it will pass on to prices. (Sijm et al. 2005, 39, 98-102.) It must be
noted that this result is very much dependent on the price elasticity of demand. If
demand is very inelastic, a monopolist can pass on more costs because demand
will not react by reducing consumption.
The market structure of electricity markets differs widely across the existing
markets in Europe, as does the generation technology mix. Due to these
differences and the many factors influencing the pass-through of carbon costs, it is
difficult to form a uniform rule for the extent of pass-through to market prices. The
€/MW
Marginal revenue
MC including CO2 cost
?Pm
?Pc
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question is very much an empirical one and needs to be studied separately for
each market area. (Sijm et al. 2005, 46.)
3.3 Price Determination under Oligopoly
In this study, the effect of emissions trading on electricity prices is studied
assuming that market power is present in the electricity market and that the
prevailing market structure is oligopoly. Market power can be defined as the ability
to alter profitably prices away from competitive level. Market power is exercised by
either reducing output or raising the price of output. Both have the same effect of
increasing prices and reducing the quantity of output sold on the market. (Stoft
2002, 316-325.)
A market is defined as oligopolistic when there are several firms in the market
which can all affect price through their actions (see Varian 1999, 468-491). In such
an environment, a firm will have to consider the response of other firms to its
actions; strategic interactions must be taken into consideration. Competition
between the firms can be seen as a game in which firms use instruments such as
price, quantity supplied, or different product characteristics to play the game
against their rivals. Games may be cooperative or non-cooperative. The focus here
will be on non-cooperative games where firms behave solely in their own self-
interest. (Tirole 1988, 205-208.)
The behaviour of firms is based on profit maximisation. Thus, at the equilibrium of
a game each firm ni ,...,1=  as indicated by the subscript should have a profit
0),( ** =ji
i
i aap , (3.1)
where the superscript in iip  indicates a partial derivative and
*
ia  the optimal action
of firm i . Note that the profit depends also on the actions of the other firms ija j ¹,
* .
The second order condition is that the choice results in a maximum
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This condition is satisfied if the firm’s profit function is strictly concave in its own
action. In this case the first order condition of (3.1) is sufficient for equilibrium.
Furthermore, this solution is a Nash equilibrium if a firm cannot increase its own
profit by choosing an action other than the equilibrium action, given the actions of
its rivals. (Tirole 1988, 205-208.)
The action taken by the firm depends on the instrument by which it competes. In
electricity markets the product is homogenous and thus varying product
characteristics is not likely to be a suitable instrument, although this could gain
ground with the introduction of labels for electricity, such as green renewable
energy. In most markets, the simplest way for firms to compete is through prices,
as they can be easily changed in the short run. Short-run price competition where
firms simultaneously and non-cooperatively choose a price is referred to as
Bertrand competition. It turns out that this competition leads to a paradox; under
the assumption of identical goods, in Nash equilibrium each firm will charge the
competitive price .* mcpi = (Tirole 1988, 209-211.)
However, the Bertrand model of competition does not suit electricity markets. This
is because the basic assumption behind this model of behaviour is that a firm can
capture the market share of others by lowering its price and expanding output to
meet increased demand. This does not work in electricity markets due to capacity
constraints and the fact that, in an auction, price is determined by the bid of the
marginal operating unit and the same price is paid to all producers. (Borenstein &
Bushnell 1999, 284; von der Fehr & Harbord 1998, 23.)
Consequently, studies of market power in electricity markets are often based on
the Cournot model of competition. Kreps and Scheinkman (1984) have shown that
in a situation where production capacities must first be set, even Bertrand price
competition leads to an equilibrium which corresponds to the outcome of a Cournot
game. In addition to capacity constraints, the increasing costs present in electricity
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markets support the choice this model. Cournot competition is a one-stage game in
which firms simultaneously choose the quantities they submit to the market and an
auctioneer determines a price to clear the market. Since the game is simultaneous,
firms will forecast their rivals’ quantity choices and base their own output decision
on these expectations. In equilibrium the expectations will be realised as the actual
produced amounts. (Varian 1999, 468-491.) The following characterisation of a
Cournot game is adapted from Tirole (1988, 207-228).
The profit for firm i  can be written as
,),()()(
1
å
=
=-=
n
i
iiiii qQqbCQPqQp (3.3)
where ip is profit for firm i , iq  is own production, P  is price, Q  is total quantity
supplied and )( ii qbC  production costs. In this general presentation 1=b . The basic
case assumes that the profit function is strictly concave in own production. This will
be realised if the demand function is concave (implying that 0'' £P ) and the firms’
cost functions are convex ( 0)('' ³iqC ).
Each firm will maximise its profit given the quantities chosen by the other firms.
The first order condition for profit maximisation is given by
.0)(')(')( =-+= iii
i
i qCQPqQPp (3.4)
The first two terms of this equation represent marginal revenue and the last term
marginal costs. Marginal revenue consists of two parts since an oligopolistic firm
recognises its influence on price; the last term represents the decrease in price
resulting from an extra unit of production. The term is negative since 0)(' <QP .
To see how the output of firm i  depends on the output of the other firms, the first
order condition is differentiated with respect to iq  and jq . Rearranging gives
,ii
i
ij
i
j
i
dq
dq
p
p
-= (3.5)
where
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Assuming a concave demand function implies that )(' QP  and )('' QP  are negative
and a convex cost function means that .0)('' ³ii qC  The sign of (3.5) is thus
negative; an increase in Q  results in a decrease in iq . This interaction can be
illustrated as a downward sloping curve called the reaction curve. It gives the best
reaction of firm i  to the quantities chosen by the other firms. The equation of the
curve can be seen by writing the first order condition in (3.4) for iq
)('
)()('
QP
QPqCq iii
-
= . (3.8)
  Figure 12 illustrates the situation for two firms.
Figure 12. Cournot equilibrium.
Source: Tirole 1988, 219.
The horizontal axis measures the production of firm 1 and the vertical axis the
production of firm 2. The equilibrium is found at the intersection of the reaction
curves R1 and R2,  with  q1* and q2* being the equilibrium amounts produced by
firms 1 and 2. This is a Cournot-Nash equilibrium, since each firm is maximising its
profit given the action of the other and neither firm could earn a higher profit by
changing output. The form of the reaction curves depends on the underlying
q1
q2
R2
R1
q1*
q2*
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assumptions about the profit function. If the profit function is not concave, the
reaction curves need not be continuous. Also, they may be nonlinear, in which
case there could be multiple equilibria.
Once the supplied quantities are known, a market clearing price will be determined
at the intersection of demand and supply. The equilibrium price is lower than what
a pure monopolist would charge. This is because, when making its output choice,
the firm considers the negative effect this will have on its own output, but not the
effect on aggregate industry output. This is seen from the second term of equation
(3.4): it is )(' QPqi , not )(' QQP . As a result, too much is produced from the
industry’s point-of-view. Also, the industry’s aggregate cost of production is not
minimised since in equilibrium marginal costs are not equalised across producers
unless they are identical. This can also be seen from (3.4).
To show that, in equilibrium, price is above the competitive level, the first order
condition for profit maximisation of (3.4) can be written as
e
a
-
=L , (3.9)
where
P
CPL '-=  is the Lerner index which measures the relative mark-up, that is,
how much price is above marginal cost,
Q
qi=a  is the market share of firm i  and
Q
P
dP
dQ
=e  is the elasticity of demand. The right-hand side of (3.9) is positive,
indicating that the Lerner index is positive and price is above marginal cost.
From (3.9) it can be seen that as the number of firms on the market increases,
lim 0=
¥®
a
Q
 and the mark-up is driven to zero. On the other hand, if 1=a , the
mark-up becomes the inverse of demand elasticity, which is the Lerner index for a
monopolist.
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The aim of this paper is to find out how dominant firms will react when they face an
increase in the level of costs due to emissions trading. Comparative statics can be
used to examine how this will look in the basic model. First, marginal costs are
increased by setting .1>b  Differentiating the first order condition in (3.4) with
respect to own production iq  and the constant b  and rearranging yields
.
)('')('')('2
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dq
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-= (3.10)
The right-hand side is negative due to the characteristics of the demand and
marginal cost functions stated above. An increase in own costs would thus result in
a decrease in own production. Once a firm reduces its production, the rivals will
react to this according to the reaction curve. As was concluded above from (3.5), if
a firm decreases its production, the rival will react by increasing production. If all
firms face an increase in costs, their actions will be influenced by two counteracting
incentives (to decrease production due to higher costs and to increase if rivals
decrease their production) and the outcome is ambiguous.
Cournot equilibrium is based on a strong assumption of perfect information. Firms
are expected to know the demand function and the cost structures of their rivals,
and it is precisely this information which allows them to correctly expect the
response of their competitor. This may seem like an unrealistic assumption, but it
must be noted that in markets such as the electricity market interaction between
firms is frequent and of a long-term nature. The firms thus get to know their
competitors and it is possible for them to collect very detailed information of their
rivals. (Stoft 2002, 341.)
52
4. Analysis
The Nordic electricity market is analysed based on the Cournot model of behaviour
presented in the previous chapter. First, the model used here will be discussed in
more detail along with alternative approaches. Second, the data will be described.
Third, the actual analysis is described, and finally, results will be presented.
4.1 The Model
In this study, the Nordic electricity market is modelled using a Cournot approach
following Borenstein and Bushnell (1999). In their (1999) study, Borenstein and
Bushnell simulate the California electricity market after deregulation to study the
potential for market power. Their study is used as an example here because the
functioning of the deregulated California market is similar to that of Nord Pool and
because the market structure they study resembles the situation in the Nordic
market; Borenstein and Bushnell model three dominant firms and a competitive
fringe, Nord Pool had four dominant firms. Also, the paper takes account of the
special role of hydropower, a point that is very important considering the significant
role of hydro in the Nordic market.
Cournot behaviour is widely applied to oligopoly markets, but its applicability to
electricity markets has been questioned. A point often made is that under Cournot
behaviour, prices may rise very high even with several competitors when demand
elasticity is low, the situation present in most electricity markets (Stoft 2002, 341;
García-Díaz & Marín 2003, 203-204). An alternative approach of supply curve
functions has gained ground in recent years. According to this method, firms will
react to uncertainty in the level of demand by submitting supply functions instead of
fixed quantities or capacities. The approach was developed by Klemperer and
Meyer (1989). Since then, Green and Newbery (1992) and von der Fehr and
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Harbord (1993) have applied supply functions to model the UK electricity market.
The former used smooth, continuous cost curves whereas the latter remarked that
bid functions are actually discontinuous, and modelled the market as a sealed bid,
multiple unit auction.
Supply functions describe the behaviour of a firm which cannot alter its supply bid
in the face of uncertain demand. Borenstein and Bushnell point out that this
uncertainty is significantly reduced when firms may bid a separate supply curve for
each hour of the day, as is done in Nord Pool. The uncertainty that still remains is
likely to be within a very limited range. Also, supply function equilibria are bounded
above by the Cournot outcome and below by the Bertrand outcome. The Cournot
result thus represents one outcome of supply function analysis, namely the worst-
case static equilibrium. Another factor speaking for the suitability of Cournot
modelling is the centralised price mechanism and capacity constraints present in
electricity markets. In the short run capacity constraints are represented by
unavailability due to maintenance and outages. This is also a relevant issue with
respect to the exercise of market power in electricity markets (see section 3.2).
(Borenstein & Bushnell 1999, 289-290.)
In what follows, the four major companies in the Nordic market are represented as
Cournot competitors. The rest of the suppliers are treated as a competitive fringe
which acts as a price taker. Transmission constraints within the Nordic market area
as well as import and export with neighbouring countries are not considered. The
price thus refers to the system price in Nord Pool. Also, modelling the opportunity
cost of water stored in reserves is beyond the scope of this paper, although this is
an important factor in the Nordic market.
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4.2 Data
The demand function and the marginal costs of the firms must be estimated for the
Cournot model. The marginal cost curves were constructed by gathering
information on electricity generation capacity and by ranking it according to
marginal production cost. The demand function is considered to be of a constant-
elasticity form, as in the study by Borenstein and Bushnell (1999). The analysis is
based on data from 2004, as this was the most recent information available at the
time.
Supply
First, the aggregate marginal cost curve for the market is formed. It represents the
marginal production cost associated with the amount of capacity present on the
Nordic market for each production technology. The data were gathered from
various reports, and it is listed in table 3 along with marginal production cost.
Marginal production costs vary between each production plant, and the values
used here are averages calculated from the various marginal costs for each plant
type reported by IEA (2005). It must be noted that the capacities shown here are
not only those participating in production but rather the total capacity available of
which some is out of use due to maintenance, temporary breakdowns or other
reasons. Also, due to the difficulty with putting together data from various sources,
it is likely that some installations used as reserve capacity or for covering extreme
demand peaks are not included in the figures used here. The merit order for Nord
Pool is depicted in figure 13.
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Table 3. Nord Pool capacity by generation technology and marginal cost.
Source: Eurelectric 2005, Nordel 2004, Kekkonen & Pursiheimo 2005, IEA 2005.
Technology
Capacity
MW
Marginal
Cost €/MWh
Hydro 46 547 11
Nuclear 12 112 12
Wind 3 665 13
CHP
Waste 582 20
Coal 7 792 15
Gas 5 438 32
Biomass 2 844 39
Condensing
Coal 3 055 20
Oil 5 792 23
Peat 1 120 21
Gas 2 757 36
Total 91 704
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Figure 13. Nord Pool merit order.
Source: Eurelectric 2005, Nordel 2004, Kekkonen & Pursiheimo 2005, IEA 2005.
As can be seen from figure 13, hydropower accounts for about half of the installed
capacity in the market. However, on average only about half of this capacity is
used for production at any given time. Hydropower and nuclear power together
account for over 50 % of capacity. These are the technologies used to provide
base load power. The more rapidly rising part of the marginal cost curve includes
CHP and condensing technologies. These are the price setting technologies, and
also those subject to carbon costs.
The large amount of installed hydro capacity would distort the results downwards,
since not all of this capacity is available for production. To get a more realistic
value for the actual hydro capacity used in 2004, the hydro production figures for
that year are divided by 8760 hours, that is, the number of hours in a year. This
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gives as the amount of hydro capacity 20 955 MW instead of 46 457 MW. All the
calculations are made with the supply curves corrected for hydro capacity.
The marginal cost curves for the dominant firms are constructed in a similar
manner. The capacities are based on those reported in the annual reports of the
companies and on the information concerning production plants given on the
companies’ websites. The figures are corrected for hydro capacity. In the case of a
company owning less than 50 % of the power plant, the plant capacity has not
been taken into account. In the case of at least a 50 % ownership, the total
capacity of the plant is added to the firm’s total capacity. The capacities by
technology are reported in table 4.
Table 4. Firm capacities.
Source: Fortum, Vattenfall 2005, E.ON 2005, Statkraft 2004.
Vattenfall Fortum* E.ON** Statkraft
Hydro 3 459 2 180 1 527 3 904
Nuclear 6 642 976 2 229 95
Wind 31
Coal 560 80
Peat 338
Oil 735 2 246
Gas 283 180
CHP coal 35 250
CHP waste 187
CHP gas 60
CHP biofuel 2 276
Total 11 374 4 640 6 262 3 999
* Fortum has additional gas turbines not reported more accurately and 1000 MW of coal
condensing in reserve, also the category “others” of 174 MW is left out.
** The category “others” of 180 MW is left out.
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To form the competitive fringe supply curve, the dominant firms’ capacities are
deducted from the total capacity of the market area. This gives as the total amount
of fringe capacity of 39 644 MW.
To be able to compare the situation before and after emissions trading, the cost of
those technologies subject to carbon control must be augmented by the amount
due to holding emission allowances. The following values are used to modify
marginal cost.
Table 5. Emission factors and thermal efficiencies of production technologies.
Source. Statistics Finland, KTM 2004
Fuel
Emission factor
gCO2/MJ
Thermal
Efficiency
Coal 94.6 0.43
Oil 77.4 0.4
Gas 55.8 0.55
CHP coal 92.7 0.87
CHP gas 55.8 0.88
Using these values and a price of 20 € for the EUA new costs are calculated. This
allowance price was chosen based on the fact that the cumulative average price
for EUAs in 2005 was 19.98 €/t (Argus 2005). The old and new merit order for the
market area is shown in figure 14.
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Figure 14. Nord Pool merit order with and without carbon costs.
A unit price of 20 € for the EUA evokes significant changes in the merit order. Also,
the cost of some technologies increases substantially, which implies that spot
prices will be pushed upwards regardless of market structure. The marginal costs
sorted from lowest to highest before and after emissions trading are listed in table
6.
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Table 6. Marginal costs before and after addition of CO2 costs.
No CO2 CO2 at 20€/t
Hydro 11 Hydro 11
Nuclear 12 Nuclear 12
Wind 13 Wind 13
CHP coal 15 CHP waste 20
CHP waste 20 CHP coal 22.82
Coal 20 Coal 35.84
Peat 21 CHP gas 36.57
Oil 23 Oil 36.93
CHP gas 32 CHP bio 39
Gas 36 Peat 40.06
CHP bio 39 Gas 43.3
The new carbon-adjusted marginal costs are used to construct new supply curves
for the market area as well as for each firm and the competitive fringe.
Demand
As in Borenstein and Bushnell, a constant elasticity demand function is used to
represent demand. The function is of the form e-= kPQ where Q  is market
demand, P  is price, e  is the price elasticity of demand and k  is a constant. A
different demand curve must be constructed for each hour that is modelled, and k
is adjusted so that the function will run through a specific known quantity-price pair
taken from the data for 2004.
Since the market includes a competitive fringe in addition to the dominant firms, the
demand faced by the Cournot players is not the total market demand, but rather
the residual demand. The residual demand function is constructed by subtracting
from the market demand the quantity that the competitive fringe would supply at
each price. The resulting demand curve is more elastic than the market demand
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and it is the one that the dominant firms will take into account when making their
production decision.
4.3 Modelling Firm Behaviour
The calculations are made for two demand levels, winter and summer. These are
chosen to represent a situation of high demand and tight capacity and a case of
low demand and ample production capacity. For both cases the situation under
perfect competition is determined as a comparison point for the results of the
Cournot game. The demand levels are taken from the Nordel statistics for the year
2004, which report the demand on the 3rd Wednesday of January and July for the
18th and 13th hour, respectively. The price for these hours was taken from the
Reuters news service (Reuters 2006), and the demand curves were constructed so
that they run through this quantity-price pair. An elasticity of -0.05 is used as this is
the demand elasticity for households estimated by Statistics Norway (Nordic
competition authorities 2003, 65). To get an idea of how demand elasticity affects
firm behaviour, the calculations are also made with demand elasticities of 0.1, 0.4
and 1, taken from Borenstein and Bushnell (1999).
Under perfect competition, all firms act as price takers so the equilibrium is found
simply by equating aggregate demand with aggregate supply. This is done for both
demand levels and with supply curves before and after carbon costs are added.
To find the Cournot equilibrium, the marginal profit functions of the four dominant
firms are formed. To make the calculations less complex, the marginal cost curves
of the firms are approximated by fitting a continuous or piecewise determined
function to the actual cost curve which is a stepwise function similar to the merit
orders in figures 13 and 14. Marginal revenue is defined as own production
multiplied by the residual demand curve, which is different for both levels of
demand and production costs. The residual demand curve is approximated by a
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smooth curve, to make the functions more manageable. Marginal revenue minus
marginal production costs constitutes the marginal profit, which must be zero in
equilibrium, taken into account the production of the other firms. This forms a set of
four simultaneous equations, which are solved for the produced amounts. A single
equilibrium can be determined since the reaction curves, despite having points of
discontinuity, are decreasing.
4.4 Results
The results from the calculations give the amount produced by each firm in
Cournot equilibrium. These can be combined with the production of the competitive
fringe to form new aggregate supply curves for each hour, which are then equated
with demand to determine price. It is assumed that each firm will produce
according to the merit order, that is, the capacities it submits to production will start
from the lowest cost and move upwards. This implies that withholding of capacity
occurs first in the higher cost technologies. When the price and marginal
technology are known for the situation before and after the inclusion of carbon
costs, the rate of pass-through can be calculated.
The results are summarised in table 7. It shows the equilibrium price and quantity
as well as the marginal technology and pass-through for both demand levels and
cost structures. PC stands for perfect competition and CC for Cournot competition
with the number 20 indicating that the cost of carbon dioxide is incorporated at a
level of 20 €/t. Additional results are presented in Appendix I.
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Table 7. Summary of results with demand elasticities 0.05, 0.1, 0.4 and 1.
Winter Summer
Elasticity 0.05 PC PC20 CC CC20 PC PC20 CC CC20
Production MW 66 069 65 723 64 846 63 065 38 671 37 868 38 671 37 868
Price €/MWh 39 43.3 56.68 98.93 15 22.82 15 22.82
Marginal technology CHP biofuel Gas CHP biofuel Gas CHP coal CHP coal CHP coal CHP coal
Pass through % 59 578 100 100
Elasticity 0.1
Production MW 66 112 65 401 64 981 63 052 39 990 38 346 39 990 38 346
Price €/MWh 39 43.3 46.19 62.43 15 22.82 15 22.82
Marginal technology CHP biofuel Gas CHP biofuel Gas CHP coal CHP coal CHP coal CHP coal
Pass through % 59 223 100 100
Elasticity 0.4
Production MW 66 112 63 498 65 355 63 072 44 524 41 345 44 524 41 345
Price €/MWh 39 43.3 40.29 44.04 18.96 22.82 18.96 22.82
Marginal technology CHP biofuel Gas CHP biofuel Gas CHP coal CHP coal CHP coal CHP coal
Pass through % 59 51 49 49
Elasticity 1
Production MW 66 112 63 355 65 713 60 868 49 281 45 106 48 985 44 858
Price €/MWh 39.2 40.91 39.44 42.58 22.56 24.32 22.39 24.45
Marginal technology CHP biofuel Peat CHP biofuel Peat Peat CHP coal Peat CHP coal
Pass through % 8 16 26 26
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It is clear from the results that the demand level and the price elasticity of demand
significantly affect the dominant firms’ possibilities for exercising market power and
passing through carbon costs. The level of demand determines whether distorting
the prices away from competitive levels is possible. In the summer when demand
is low the equilibrium prices and quantities are exactly identical under perfect and
imperfect competition for elasticities 0.05, 0.1 and 0.4, but differ slightly for the
most price elastic demand. In all cases the pass-through rate is the same for both
market structures, which naturally results from the fact that the dominant firms are
unable to increase price above the competitive level. The pass-through rate is thus
only affected by possible merit order changes and the level of demand elasticity.
As theory suggests, the pass-through rate decreases as demand becomes more
elastic going from 100 % in the case of very inelastic demand to 26 % for the most
elastic demand.
The winter situation is quite different. Capacity is tight and already almost at its limit
under perfect competition. In such a case even a slight reduction in produced
amounts quickly leads to large price increases, especially if demand is very
inelastic. This is exactly what happens when price elasticity is 0.05. The dominant
firms are able to raise the price from the competitive level of 39 € to 56.68 € when
carbon costs are not included. Once the cost structures are changed, this
difference becomes even greater with the Cournot equilibrium price settling at
98.93 €, implying a pass-through rate of 578 %. This rather exaggerated price
increase is made possible by limited capacity and price insensitive demand, which
is evident in figure 15 illustrating the situation. The merit order of the competitive
market is shown for comparison, labelled PC .
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Figure 15. Cournot equilibrium, winter demand, elasticity 0.05.
Increasing demand elasticity importantly reduces the dominant firms’ possibilities
for affecting price. With demand elasticity of 0.4, the Cournot equilibrium prices are
only slightly above competitive prices, and interestingly, the pass-through rate is
lower under imperfect competition. This is due to the fact that, because of
imperfect competition, price was already on a higher level compared to the
competitive price before carbon costs. Yet, because of a more responsive demand,
the firms are not able to increase price significantly once carbon costs are
included. The change between the two price levels is therefore smaller than under
perfect competition (see figure 11 in section 3.2.2).
Once price elasticity of demand is increased to 1, the pass-through rates become
very low. This is due to merit order changes. The pass-through rate indicates how
big a proportion of its cost increase the new marginal producer manages to pass
on to the price. The marginal technology under the new cost structure is peat,
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which faces a cost increase of 19 € when CO2 is priced at 20 €/t. Before the
change in production costs peat features low in the merit order, and the equilibrium
price is well above its marginal costs. In the new equilibrium, it does cover its new
costs which are 40.06 €/MWh but the price increase from the equilibrium excluding
carbon is only a small fraction of the increase in production costs faced by the new
marginal producer. Price does not rise by 19 €, thus the low pass-through rate (see
figure 9 in section 3.2.2). The situation is illustrated in figure 16. It can be well seen
from the picture that even though dominant firms withhold production once carbon
costs are added, this only results in a small price increase due to the price
sensitivity of demand.
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Figure 16. Cournot equilibrium, winter, demand elasticity 1.
It is thus evident that the price elasticity of demand determines how much
dominant firms may push up the price when demand is high and capacity tight. The
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relationship between elasticity and equilibrium prices for winter demand is shown in
figure 17.
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Figure 17. Demand elasticity and winter equilibrium prices.
It can be seen that the possibilities for raising price increase significantly once
demand becomes very inelastic. With elasticities higher than 0.4 the prices under
perfect and imperfect competition are very close to each other, but with lower
elasticity divergence quickly emerges with the inclusion of CO2 costs aggravating
the situation.
A similar relationship prevails between demand elasticity and the pass-through
rate. Imperfect competition makes it possible for firms to overstate the impact of
carbon costs on the price of electricity when demand is inelastic. This is illustrated
in figure 18.
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Figure 18. Elasticity and pass-through rate in winter.
Looking at the results for winter and summer demand levels, it can be seen that
the situation of tight capacity leads to more extreme results with the prices ranging
from 39 € to 99 € and the pass-through rate being between 8 % and 578 %
depending on demand elasticity. Also, dominant firms succeed in raising the price
even under the most price-responsive demand. A lower level of demand does not
permit this. Overall, it is seen that the inclusion of costs due to emissions trading
does increase price levels, and this increase can be severely exacerbated by the
exercise of market power when demand is unresponsive to price changes.
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5. Conclusions
The European Union Emissions Trading Scheme has brought forth an obligation to
cover emissions of carbon dioxide with a corresponding amount of allowances
received by free allocation or bought on the European market. This obligation
covers several sectors of which the energy sector is the most prominent one. The
fact that the energy markets are mostly regional has lead to fears that the extra
cost from environmental regulation will be passed on to electricity prices, a
scenario which worries especially electricity intensive industries.
Consequently, several reports on the subject have recently emerged. They differ in
their scope and viewpoint but seem to have one result in common; the impact of
the EU ETS on the price of electricity is very much dependent on the structure of
the market in question, on demand patterns and demand elasticity, and on the
production technology mix. A comprehensive, universal answer to the question
cannot be given.
This paper has addressed the issue of the EU ETS and electricity prices from the
perspective of the Nordic electricity market and imperfect competition. Previously
this issue has been studied only before the official launch of the EU ETS when
data were scarce and, as concerns the Nordic market,  ignoring the possibility of
imperfect electricity markets. The recently integrated Nordic market is considered
to be a good example of a successful electricity market liberalisation process but it
has recently been subject to increased speculation of the use of market power. The
existence of four big companies on the market implies an oligopoly market
structure, which is why Cournot analysis was chosen to study the reactions of the
market to carbon dioxide regulation. The Cournot approach has been criticised
especially because it may give extreme results when demand is very inelastic. This
is a point worth considering when looking at the results; they are not meant to be
exact predictions of price development but rather an indication of the potential and
magnitude of market power.
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In the analysis, the four biggest firms were displayed as Cournot players while the
rest of the producers act as a competitive fringe. The analysis was carried out for
two levels of demand and several demand elasticities. In all cases, the perfect
competition equilibrium was defined as a reference situation. The results imply that
potential for market power does indeed exist in the Nordic market, but the
possibility for exercising market power depends on the demand level. In situations
of scarce capacity, which usually occur in winter time, the dominant firms may raise
the price of electricity significantly above competitive levels. The situation is
aggravated when the cost of carbon is accounted for; price is much higher than
what simple coverage of costs would require. The results are highly dependent on
the price elasticity of demand. When elasticity is 0.4 or higher, the difference
between perfect competition and Cournot competition is reduced, although a small
divergence does exist. Making use of market power is not possible at lower levels
of demand; the Cournot outcomes under summer demand are identical with the
outcomes of perfect competition.
In the light of these results it seems that the concern over an imperfect electricity
market combined with emissions trading is justified. However, it must be borne in
mind that the results depict the extreme case of market distortion. Also, there are
many important points which could affect results, but they are beyond the scope of
this study. Possibly the most influential one of these is the role of hydro power.
Water can be stored in reservoirs; hydro power thus has an opportunity cost which
affects the choice of producers. Lavish use of water in summer would lead to
smaller reserves during winter. This withdrawing of capacity in winter time would
lead to higher prices and increased value of the remaining water reserve. (See
Liski (2006) for a more detailed description of using hydro power for raising prices.)
Also, import and export of electricity, as well as transmission constraints and
losses are not taken into account. Trading electricity internationally decreases
market power, since it adds to the amount of actors on the market. Transmission
constraints, on the other hand, provide an additional tool for exercising market
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power. If a producer deliberately congests a line, it could succeed in creating a
local market area in which it has monopoly power. The Nordic market is often
divided into two or more price areas due to congested transmission lines; this is
therefore an interesting point in view of future research.
The analysis in this paper is carried out with data from 2004. Since then, there
have been considerable changes in the ownership structure of the largest
companies. As a result, the two biggest players now have an even larger share of
the market. Considering that the electricity market seems to be moving in the
direction of increased mergers and cross-ownership of plants, it would be important
to find out under a more detailed study just how big the potential for market power
is and what are its consequences.
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Appendix I
Production by Firm
Sorting the results by each firm shows how the Cournot competitors individually
react to a change in the cost structure. The following table lists the produced
amounts by dominating firm.
Table A1. Produced amounts by firm.
Vattenfall Fortum E.ON Statkraft
MW CC CC20 CC CC20 CC CC20 CC CC20
Elasticity 0.05
Winter 10 659 10 946 4 462 4 640 6 082 3 836 3 999 3 999
Summer 5 188 8 159 3 156 3 156 3 756 3 756 3 999 3 999
Elasticity 0.1
Winter 10 779 10 933 4 477 4 640 6 082 3 836 3 999 3 999
Summer 5 959 9 250 3 156 3 156 3 756 3 756 3 999 3 999
Elasticity 0.4
Winter 11 105 10 953 4 525 4 640 6 082 3 836 3 999 3 999
Summer 10 132 10 132 3 610 3 156 3 756 3 756 3 999 3 999
Elasticity 1
Winter 11 267 11 020 4 541 4 488 6 262 3 836 3 999 3 999
Summer 10 471 10 252 4 027 3 278 3 849 3 756 3 999 3 999
It can be seen that Statkraft produces at full output in all cases. Its capacity
consists of only hydro and wind technology, resulting in significantly lower costs
than what the other firms face; Statkraft’s marginal cost curve is almost flat
compared to the rapidly rising costs of its competitors. As a result, it is most
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profitable for the firm to act as a price taker and not engage in withholding
production. The price Statkraft receives is in any case well above its marginal
costs.
It is also evident from the above results that how a firm reacts to the increase in
costs cannot be told beforehand. E.ON systematically decreases production as
costs increase in all cases, but Vattenfall and Fortum react differently, in fact, they
most often increase production after CO2 costs have been taken into account. This
illustrates the fact that a firm’s decisions are influenced not only by its own cost
structure but also by the actions of its rivals.
Total Quantity Withheld
 Market power is exercised by withholding production and thus moving the supply
curve to the left, resulting in demand and supply intersecting at a higher price. In all
the cases studied here, the dominant firms succeeded in raising the price under
winter conditions when demand is high and capacity scarce. It is interesting to look
at the quantities withheld which lead to this result. Table 2A reports the total
amount of quantity withheld from the market in each case. This is calculated as
total capacity available under perfect competition minus total capacity available
under imperfect competition.
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Table 2A. Quantity withheld.
MW CC CC20
Elasticity 0.05
Winter 1 266 3 047
Summer 10 368 7 398
Elasticity 0.1
Winter 1 131 3 060
Summer 9 598 6 307
Elasticity 0.4
Winter  757 3 040
Summer 4 971 5 425
Elasticity 1
Winter 399 3 124
Summer 4 122 5 182
Overall it can be seen that the quantity withheld is larger when demand elasticity is
low and decreases as demand becomes more elastic. This is logical; when
demand is responsive to price, decreasing production leads to smaller price
changes and bigger changes in consumed quantities. It is not profitable to raise
price too much since it will drive away consumption.
As was the case for an individual firm’s production, also the total quantity withheld
is not systematically higher or lower after the change in cost structure. In all winter
cases firms withhold more capacity as costs increase, but in summer the situation
is reversed for demand elasticities 0.05 and 0.1. This reflects the behaviour of the
individual firms; production decisions depend on the prevailing demand situation
and the actions of competitors. It might not be profitable to always react in the
same way.
Interestingly, the withheld quantities are larger in summer than in winter. Despite
this more drastic behaviour by the dominating firms, equilibrium prices and
quantities were identical under perfect competition and Cournot competition in
summer demand conditions. This highlights the fact that the firms’ possibilities for
raising price are dependent on the prevailing demand situation and available
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capacity. Exercising market power is most profitable when the market is near to
capacity limits and the very sharply rising part of the aggregate supply curve.
